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Please cite this article as: Péter Csóka, Ferenc Illés, Tamás Solymosi, On the Shap-
ley value of liability games, European Journal of Operational Research (2021), doi:
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2021.10.012
This is a PDF file of an article that has undergone enhancements after acceptance, such as the addition
of a cover page and metadata, and formatting for readability, but it is not yet the definitive version of
record. This version will undergo additional copyediting, typesetting and review before it is published
in its final form, but we are providing this version to give early visibility of the article. Please note that,
during the production process, errors may be discovered which could affect the content, and all legal
disclaimers that apply to the journal pertain.
© 2021 Published by Elsevier B.V.
Highlights
• We propose a basis for the linear vector space of constant-sum games
• The Shapley value in liability games satisfies order preservation
• Liability monotonicity, asset monotonicity, and super-modularity also holds
• Calculating the Shapley value is non-deterministic polynomial-time hard
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Abstract
In a liability problem, the asset value of an insolvent firm must be distributed
among the creditors and the firm itself, when the firm has some freedom in ne-
gotiating with the creditors. We model the negotiations using cooperative game
theory and analyze the Shapley value to resolve such liability problems. We es-
tablish three main monotonicity properties of the Shapley value. First, creditors
can only benefit from the increase in their claims or of the asset value. Second,
the firm can only benefit from the increase of a claim but can end up with more or
with less if the asset value increases, depending on the configuration of small and
large liabilities. Third, creditors with larger claims benefit more from the increase
of the asset value. Even though liability games are constant-sum games and we
show that the Shapley value can be calculated directly from a liability problem,
we prove that calculating the Shapley payoff to the firm is NP-hard.
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1 Introduction
An insolvent firm (country, state, individual, etc.) with some asset value has liabilities
towards a group of creditors. Compared to standard bankruptcy games as studied
in the game-theoretical literature (see (O’Neill, 1982) for a seminal contribution and
(Thomson, 2013), and (Thomson, 2015) for recent surveys) Csóka and Herings (2019)
introduced liability problems, by modeling the firm as an explicit player. A liability
problem is given by the asset value of the firm to be allocated and the claims of the
creditors.
Instead of directly using the values given in a liability problem, Csóka and Herings
(2019) defined liability games to indirectly allocate the asset value using a solution
concept from cooperative game theory with transferable utility. The worth of a coalition
in a liability game is defined as follows. Given a coalition and its complement, the firm
first makes payments to the coalition it belongs to, up to the value of the liabilities
in the firm’s coalition and the asset value of the firm, and then (if possible) pays to
the complementary coalition. They remarked that liability games are superadditive:
there is no loss of merging disjoint coalitions. Moreover, they proved that the core of
a liability game is empty and analyzed one of the two most popular solution concepts,
the nucleolus (Schmeidler, 1969).
In this paper, we investigate the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953) of liability games1.
The numerous applications of the Shapley value include aircraft landing fees (Littlechild
and Owen, 1973; Dubey, 1982), minimal cost spanning trees (Bergantinos and Lorenzo-
Freire, 2008), a combinatorial structure called augmenting system (Bilbao and Ordóñez,
2009), directed graph games (Khmelnitskaya, Selçuk, and Talman, 2016), risk capital
allocation (Balog, Bátyi, Csóka, and Pintér, 2017), and environmental costs in supply
chains (Ciardiello, Genovese, and Simpson, 2018), among others.
We show that the Shapley value can also be used as a liability allocation, that is,
it allocates the asset value non-negatively among the creditors and the firm in such a
way that no creditor gets more than his liability. We establish lower and upper bounds
for the Shapley payments. Moreover, we show that (i) creditors can only benefit from
the increase in their claims or of the asset value; (ii) the firm can only benefit from the
increase of a claim but can end up with more or with less if the asset value increases,
1We also assume transferable utility (TU), assuming that money has the same utility for all the
players and utility functions are linear and separable in it. We believe that the TU assumption is
a good approximation in many applications. However, we also note possible generalizations towards
nontransferable utility (NTU). For the first formal NTU bankruptcy game see (Orshan, Valenciano, and
Zarzuelo, 2003), for recent advances see, for instance, (Dietzenbacher, Borm, and Estévez-Fernández,
2020; Dietzenbacher and Peters, 2020; Estévez-Fernández, Borm, and Fiestras-Janeiro, 2020).
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depending on the configuration of small and large liabilities; (iii) creditors with larger
claims benefit more from the increase of the asset value. In most cases, we even establish
sharp upper bounds for the changes in the payments.
It is easy to check that in liability games, for one or two creditors (that is, for two
or three players), the Shapley value coincides with the nucleolus. However, for three or
more creditors, they give different payoffs in generic examples. Csóka and Herings (2019)
showed that at the nucleolus of a liability game, the firm gets a positive payment, which
is at most half of the asset value. We show that at the Shapley value, there are cases
when the firm can keep almost the whole asset value. Csóka and Herings (2019) also
showed that at the nucleolus, creditors with higher liabilities receive higher payments,
but they also get higher debt forgiveness (defined as the difference between the liability
and the received payments), a result we also have for the Shapley value. They also
provided conditions under which the nucleolus coincides with a generalized proportional
rule, where the firm gets a positive amount, and the rest is allocated in proportional to
the liabilities.
Csóka and Herings (2019) noted that in a liability game, the worth of a coalition
plus the worth of the complementary coalition is always equal to the asset value, that
is, a liability game is a constant-sum game (Von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944).
Originally, Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) analyzed strategic non-cooperative
games, where a coalition and the complementary coalition play a constant-sum game.
They discussed constant-sum simple games with winning or losing coalitions, where the
worth of any coalition can be either zero or one. A prominent application is (weighted)
majority voting games, where the worth of the grand coalition is one, and if a coalition
is winning, then its complementary coalition is losing. Constant-sum games also play a
role in games modeling Bitcoin mining pools (Lewenberg, Bachrach, Sompolinsky, Zohar,
and Rosenschein, 2015). For a recent generalization to alpha-constant-sum games, see
(Wang, van den Brink, Sun, Xu, and Zou, 2019). A related new concept is called games
of threats (Kohlberg and Neyman, 2018), where the constant sum is zero, but the value
of the empty coalition is not always zero. For more details on the value theory of
strategic games, see (Cai, Candogan, Daskalakis, and Papadimitriou, 2016).
Since constant-sum games are exciting on their own, we first study the Shapley
value for constant-sum games in general. We propose a basis for the linear vector space
of constant-sum games that provides a specialized formula for the Shapley payoff to
a player in a constant-sum game. It turns out that some of those general results are
very handy for liability games. We obtain a simple computational scheme by which the
Shapley value of a liability game is derived directly from the liability problem, that is,
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from the asset value and the liabilities.
In general, computing the Shapley value based on its definition is practically im-
possible for large games. Computing the Shapley value in weighted majority games is
#P-complete (Deng and Papadimitriou, 1994) and one has to rely on its estimation. Es-
timation techniques were introduced by Castro, Gómez, and Tejada (2009) and Castro,
Gómez, Molina, and Tejada (2017). However, for special classes of games, the Shapley
value can be calculated in a polynomial manner (Megiddo, 1978; Granot, Kuipers, and
Chopra, 2002; Castro, Gómez, and Tejada, 2008). We show that in liability games,
calculating the Shapley value of the insolvent firm is NP-hard. Thus even though the
Shapley value can be calculated directly from the liability problem, its application to
large liability problems could become computationally laborious.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we consider general constant-sum
games. In Section 3, we introduce liability games, show that the Shapley value can be
used as a liability allocation. In Section 4, we prove various properties of the Shapley
liability allocation rule. Section 5, we show that calculating the Shapley value of the
firm is NP-hard. Section 6 contains concluding remarks and possibilities for further
research.
2 The Shapley value of constant-sum games
A transferable utility cooperative game (N, v) is a pair where N is a non-empty, finite
set of players and v : 2N → R is a coalitional function satisfying v(∅) = 0. The number
v(S) is regarded as the worth of the coalition S ⊆ N . We identify the game with its
coalitional function since the player set N is fixed throughout the paper. The game
(N, v) is called 0-normalized if v({i}) = 0 for every i ∈ N ; superadditive if S ∩ T = ∅
implies v(S) + v(T ) ≤ v(S ∪ T ) for every two coalitions S, T ⊆ N . The game (N, v) is
constant-sum if v(S) + v(N \ S) = v(N) for every coalition S ⊆ N .
Given a game (N, v), a payoff allocation x ∈ RN represents the payoffs to the players.
The total payoff to coalition S ⊆ N is denoted by x(S) = ∑i∈S xi if S 6= ∅ and x(∅) = 0.
In a game v, we say the payoff allocation x is efficient, if x(N) = v(N); individually
rational, if xi = x({i}) ≥ v({i}) for all i ∈ N ; coalitionally rational, if x(S) ≥ v(S) for
all S ⊆ N . The set of preimputations, I∗(v), consists of the efficient payoff vectors, the
set of imputations, I(v), consists of the individually rational preimputations, and the
core, C(v), is the set of coalitionally rational (pre)imputations. We call a game balanced
if its core is non-empty.
We denote the set of all cooperative games on a fixed player set N by GN . It is
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well-known that GN is a linear vector space of dimension 2n− 1 where n = |N |. A value
on GN is a map f : GN → RN , which assigns to every game v on N a vector f(v) with
components fi(v) for all i ∈ N . We say that value f satisfies
• linearity : if f(αv + βw) = αf(v) + βf(w) holds for all α, β ∈ R and v, w ∈ GN .
• efficiency : if ∑j∈N fj(v) = v(N) holds for all v ∈ GN .
• the equal treatment property : if j, k ∈ N are symmetric players in game v ∈ GN ,
that is if v(S ∪ j) = v(S ∪ k) ∀S ⊆ N \ {j, k}, then fj(v) = fk(v).
• the null player property : if j ∈ N is a null player in game v ∈ GN , that is if
v(S ∪ j)− v(S) = 0 ∀S ⊆ N \ j, then fj(v) = 0.
The best known and most frequently used value for general coalitional games was
introduced and characterized by a few appealing properties by Lloyd Shapley.














) and s = |S|, n = |N |, is the only value on
GN that satisfies linearity, efficiency, the equal treatment property, and the null player
property.
The Shapley value can also be axiomatized using various alternative sets of axioms.
A prominent one is due to Young (1985) who replaced linearity and the null player
property with marginality (which requires that the value of a player i depend only on
the player’s marginal contributions v(S ∪ i)− v(S) in a game v). Pintér (2015) proved
that Young’s axiomatization also holds for various special classes of games.
For constant-sum games, Khmelnitskaya (2003) characterized the Shapley value with
the set of axioms used by Young (1985). In their illuminating paper, Kohlberg and
Neyman (2018) (Corollary 2) showed that the Shapley value can also be characterized
with Shapley’s original set of axioms. For a common generalization of constant-sum
coalitional games and games of threats we refer to the paper by Wang, van den Brink,
Sun, Xu, and Zou (2019) where the aformentioned axiomatizations of the Shapley value
are extended to alpha-constant-sum games.
Although in his seminal paper Shapley (1953) has not discussed the axiomatization
of his value for special classes of games, he derived a specialized formula for constant-
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sum games. For the sake of completeness, we also present the short proof. Let GNCS
denote the set of all constant-sum games on fixed player set N .
Proposition 2. (Shapley, 1953) The Shapley value of constant-sum game v ∈ GNCS is
φi(v) = −v(N) + 2
∑
S⊆N\i
γN(S)v(S ∪ i) (i ∈ N). (2)
Proof. Let v be a constant-sum game and i ∈ N be fixed. For S ⊆ N \ i, we have
v(S) = v(N)− v(N \ S) = v(N)− v((N \ i \ S)∪ i). If we substitute this in the general
formula (1), we get φi(v) =
∑
S⊆N\i






= γn(n− 1− s) and N \ i \ S ⊆ N \ i, each coalition value of
type v(T ∪ i) for T ⊆ N \ i appears twice and is weighted by the same coefficient in the
sum. Taking out the constant term −v(N) from the summation, we get (2).
It is well-known that the weight coefficients {γN(S)}S⊆N\i form a probability distri-
bution, we call it the Shapley distribution, on the family 2N\i of coalitions which do not
contain player i. Therefore, in general, φi(v) is the expected marginal contribution of
player i in v to coalitions not containing i, when the random formation of such coali-
tions is described by the Shapley distribution. Notice that in constant-sum games, the
Shapley payoff to a player depends only on the values of coalitions the player belongs
to, no need to compute his marginal contributions. Since γN(S) depends only on the
cardinalities n = |N | and s = |S| of the two coalitions, we also write γn(s) when more
convenient.
Next, we investigate how the Shapley value of constant-sum games can be computed
based on its linearity. Although our arguments would resemble the standard Shapley-
type uniqueness proofs (cf. (Shapley, 1953), or for constant-sum games, (Kohlberg
and Neyman, 2018) and (Wang, van den Brink, Sun, Xu, and Zou, 2019)), our aim
is not to give another characterization but to find a basis which facilitates an “easy”
decomposition of constant-sum games. Indeed, we work with a “trivial” basis in which
the determination of the coefficients (Harsányi dividends) in the linear decomposition
require no computation. This computational simplicity comes at the price of not being
able to apply the null player property for our basic “trivial” constant-sum games.
It is easily seen that any linear combination of constant-sum games is also a constant-
sum game. Thus GNCS is a linear subspace of GN . It is well-known that additive games
are the only balanced constant-sum games, so the standard approach of decomposing a
game as a linear combination of unanimity games, which are balanced games, cannot
be followed for GNCS. Only the additive unanimity games, that is, the dictator games
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u{i} (i ∈ N), could be part of a basis for GNCS, but they are sufficient to span only the
n-dimensional linear subspace of GNCS consisting of the additive constant-sum games. On
the other hand, the average of an unanimity game and its dual game is a constant-sum
game (in which the players outside the carrier coalition are null players), and all the
aformentioned characterization proofs ((Khmelnitskaya, 2003), (Kohlberg and Neyman,
2018), (Wang, van den Brink, Sun, Xu, and Zou, 2019) ) apply these basic constant-sum
games.
Foreshadowing the application of the game-theoretic results in this section to a spe-
cial type of constant-sum games induced by liability problems with an insolvent firm, we
arbitrarily choose a player (the insolvent firm) and denote him by 0 ∈ N . The set of the
n−1 other players is denoted by C = N \{0}. Given this fixed “highlighted” player, the
family of all coalitions is decomposed in two parts of equal size: the 2n−1 “partner” coali-
tions containing 0 and the 2n−1 “complement” coalitions. Let P0 = {S ⊆ N : 0 ∈ S}
denote the family of partner coalitions of 0, and C0 = {S ⊆ N : 0 /∈ S} denote the
family of coalitions not containing 0. Obviously, S ∈ P0 if and only if N \ S ∈ C0, In
particular, N ∈ P0 and ∅ ∈ C0, also {0} ∈ P0 and C ∈ C0.
In a constant-sum game v ∈ GNCS, we have v(N \ S) = v(N) − v(S) for all S ∈ P0,
thus the values of the partner coalitions v(S) (S ∈ P0) suffice to fully determine v.
It follows that the dimension of GNCS is at most 2n−1 = |P0|. Next, we show that, in
fact, equality holds. We present 2n−1 linearly independent “elementary” constant-sum
games, which form a very “convenient” basis of GNCS, inasmuch the scalar coefficients in
the (unique) linear decompositions are simply the coalitional values.





1, if S = R,
−1, if S = N \R,
0, otherwise.
(3)





1, if S = N or 0 /∈ S 6= ∅,
0, otherwise.
(4)
It is easily checked that dR(∅) = 0 and dR is indeed constant-sum for all R ∈ P0.
Moreover, dN(S) = 1 but dR(S) = 0 for all S 6= R ∈ P0. Notice that for all R, S ∈ P0,
we have dR(S) = 1 if and only if R = S, but dR(S) = 0 otherwise. It follows that the
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2n−1 = |P0| games dR (R ∈ P0) are linearly independent in GNCS.
We summarize the above discussion in the following proposition.
Proposition 3. The games dR ∈ GNCS (R ∈ P0) form a basis of GNCS, henceforth
dim(GNCS) = 2n−1. Moreover, v(S) =
∑
R∈P0
v(R) · dR(S) for all S ⊆ N and v ∈ GNCS,




The basis game values dR(S) (R, S ∈ P0) form a unit matrix, thus by formula (2),






2γn(r − 1), if R 6= N,
−1 + 2γn(n− 1), if R = N.
(5)
The payoffs to the players in C = N \ {0} can then be easily obtained from efficiency
and the equal treatment property of the Shapley value.
For R ∈ P0 \ {N}, in basis game dR the players in R are all symmetric, so φ0(dR) =
φi(d
R) for all i ∈ R. Similarly, the players in N \R are all symmetric, so φj(dR) = φk(dR)
for all j, k ∈ N \ R. Since dR(N) = 0, efficiency gives rφ0(dR) + (n − r)φk(dR) = 0,
where k ∈ N \R. From (5) we easily derive the Shapley payoffs in basis game dR when






2γn(r − 1), if i ∈ R,
−2γn(r), if i ∈ N \R.
(6)
For R = N , in basis game dN all non-distinguished players in C are symmetric, so
φj(d
N) = φk(d
N) for all j, k ∈ N \ {0}. Since dN(N) = 1, efficiency gives φ0(dN) + (n−
1)φk(d






−1 + 2γn(n− 1), if i = 0,
2γn(n− 1), if i 6= 0.
(7)
Notice that none of the players is a null player in any of the basis games dR with carrier
R ∈ P0.
Sharing system (8) schematically summarizes the above formulas. The columns
correspond to the partner coalitions of the form R = {0}∪S. The first line in the header
specifies the number of partners s = |S| of player 0, the second line gives the number of
coalitions in that category. The third header line indicates the two subcategories (except
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for the two boundary cases: for the empty set in the first column, and for the full partner
set in the last column) whether an arbitrarily fixed player i 6= 0 is a partner of 0 or not.
The fourth line gives the number of coalitions in the subcategories. Any given player

















coalitions do not contain i. The two (highlighted) rows
of the table give the Shapley values of players in the basis constant-sum games with
carrier coalitions of the form R = {0} ∪ S, first for our distinguished player 0, second
for a generic other player i ∈ C.



































φ0 2γn(0) · · · 2γn(s) 2γn(s) · · · −1 + 2γn(n− 1)
φi −2γn(1) · · · 2γn(s) −2γn(s+ 1) · · · 2γn(n− 1)
(8)
The following features of the Shapley sharing system are easily checked.
Proposition 4. In the Shapley sharing system (8)
1. the φ0 row sum = 1, every other φi (i ∈ C) row sum = 0;
2. the s = n− 1 column sum = 1, every other 0 ≤ s ≤ n− 2 column sum = 0.
For illustration, we give the Shapley sharing system for 3-player constant-sum games
on N = {0} ∪ C with C = {1, 2}:

















partner S = ∅ S = {1} S = {2} S = C
carrier R = {0} R = {0, 1} R = {0, 2} R = N
φ0 2/3 1/3 1/3 −1/3
φ1 −1/3 1/3 −2/3 2/3
φ2 −1/3 −2/3 1/3 2/3
(9)
We replaced the subcategorization in the third and fourth header lines in (8) with the
actual set of partners S and the corresponding carrier coalitions R in (9).
10
         
The Shapley payoffs are easily computed from sharing system (9) for any 3-player
constant-sum game v with distinguished player 0. We simply take the linear combination
of the “partner” coalition values weighted with the “shares” of the given player. In
formula,
φ0(v) =
2v0 + v01 + v02 − vN
3
, φi(v) =
−v0 + v0i − 2v0j + 2vN
3
(i 6= j), (10)
where coalitions are described without braces and separating commas but overlined: for
example, 0j means coalition {0, j}. Its value is shorthanded as v0j = v(0j).
Although in a general constant-sum game distinguishing one arbitrarily picked player
served only technical purposes, next, we discuss a special type of constant-sum game
where one player is indeed “different” from the other players.
3 Liability games and the Shapley value
We consider a special class of constant-sum games, liability games, introduced by Csóka
and Herings (2019).
Let N = {0, 1, . . . , c} denote the set of agents, where agent 0 is a firm having a set of
creditors C = {1, . . . , c} with cardinality |C| = c ≥ 1. The firm has asset value A ∈ R+
and liabilities ` ∈ RC+, with `i ∈ R+ the liability to creditor i ∈ C. The question is how
to allocate the asset value among the creditors and the firm. If the firm is solvent, that
is,
∑
i∈C `i ≤ A, then the obvious solution is that every creditor receives its full claim
and the firm keeps the rest. Henceforth we only consider the insolvent case, but for ease
of presentation, we also allow borderline solvency, that is,
∑
i∈C `i = A.
Definition 5. A liability problem is a pair (A, `) ∈ R+ × RC+ such that
∑
i∈C `i ≥ A.
Let LN denote the class of liability problems2 on set of agents N = {0} ∪ C. We
seek a liability rule that assigns a unique allocation to each liability problem.
Definition 6 (Csóka and Herings (2019)). A liability rule is a function f : LN → RN+
such that, for every (A, `) ∈ LN , the payment vector f = f(A, `) ∈ RN is an allocation,
that is a non-negative vector f ∈ R+ × RC+ satisfying liabilities boundedness, that is,
fi ≤ `i for all i ∈ C, and efficiency, that is,
∑
i∈N fi = A.
2Csóka and Herings (2019) consider a slightly restricted class, when all liabilities are at most as
large as the asset value, the asset value is strictly positive, there are at least two creditors and the firm
is insolvent.
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Note that by non-negativity and efficiency, the payments in allocation f ∈ RN fall
between the following bounds:
0 ≤ f0 ≤ A and 0 ≤ fi ≤ `Ai for all i ∈ C,
where `Ai = min{A, `i} is the truncated liability of creditor i ∈ C. Let `A ∈ RC+ denote
the vector of liabilities truncated by the asset value.
Given a subset of creditors S ⊆ C, we will use the notation `S = `(S) =
∑
i∈S `i for




i for the total truncated liabilities of S. On
the other hand, we will also use the shorthand `AS = min{A, `(S)} = min{A, `A(S)} for
the truncated total (truncated) liabilities of creditor group S ⊆ C. Clearly, `AS ≤ `A(S).
A liability problem gives rise to a transferable utility cooperative game called liability
game (Csóka and Herings, 2019).
Definition 7. Let (A, `) ∈ LN be a liability problem. On player set N , the induced
liability game v : 2N → R is defined by setting, for S ∈ 2N ,
v(S) =
{
min{A, `(S \ {0})} = `AS\{0}, if 0 ∈ S,
max{0, A− `(C \ S)}, if 0 6∈ S.
The interpretation of a liability game is as follows. Given a coalition and its comple-
ment, the firm first makes payments to the coalition it belongs to, up to the value of the
liabilities in the firm’s coalition and the asset value of the firm, and then (if possible)
pays to the complementary coalition.
Note that v(∅) = 0, 0 ≤ v(S) ≤ A for all S ∈ 2N , and v(N) = A. Csóka and
Herings (2019) note that liability games are superadditive, that is, for all S, T ∈ 2N ,
S ∩ T = ∅ implies v(S) + v(T ) ≤ v(S ∪ T ); and constant-sum, that is, for all S ∈ 2N ,
v(S)+v(N \S) = v(N). Due to their superadditivity and nonnegativity, liability games
are monotonic, that is, for all S, T ∈ 2N , S ⊂ T implies v(S) ≤ v(T ).
We aim to define a liability rule by applying the Shapley value to the induced liability
game. This works in practice only if we can compute the Shapley-vector of the liability
game directly from the data of the underlying liability problem, that is, from the asset
value and the liabilities. The following straightforward observation implies that our
indirect approach could only provide a liability rule that ignores excessive parts of the
claims. Notice that cutting off the parts of liabilities over the asset value does not make
the firm solvent, that is, `(C) ≥ A implies `A(C) ≥ A.
Remark 8. Liability problems (A, `) and (A, `A) induce the same liability game, where
`A denotes the vector of liabilities truncated by the asset value.
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It follows that the Shapley rule (or any other liability allocation rule defined via a
single-valued solution of the induced game) is different from rules that allocate (some
portion of) the asset value among the creditors proportional to their claims (or to their
truncated liabilities).
Next, we show that the Shapley value indeed defines a liability rule, that is, the
Shapley-vector of the liability game associated with a liability problem is an allocation.
Proposition 9. Let (A, `) ∈ LN be a liability problem and let v be the induced liability
game on N . Then the Shapley-vector φ(v) of v satisfies efficiency, non-negativity, and
(truncated) liabilities boundedness.
Proof. The Shapley value assigns an efficient vector to any TU game, so for any liability
game (N, v) we have
∑
i∈N φi(v) = v(N) = A. By monotonicity of liability games all
marginal contributions are non-negative, hence the Shapley payoffs are non-negative.
To prove (truncated) liabilities boundedness, let i ∈ C be a creditor and S ⊆ N \ i.
We have two cases. If 0 ∈ S, so v(S∪i)−v(S) = min{`(S \0)+`i, A}−min{`(S \0), A},
then the difference is clearly at most `i. If 0 /∈ S, so v(S ∪ i)− v(S) = max{A− `(C \
S) + `i, 0}−max{A− `(C \S), 0}, then again the difference is clearly at most `i. Thus,
we get that all marginal contributions, hence the Shapley payoffs to all creditors are
upper bounded by the liabilities. Since non-negativity and efficiency imply φi ≤ A for
all i ∈ N , including the firm, for creditor i ∈ C we can sharpen the upper bound to
φi ≤ `Ai .
Next, we define (truncated) debt forgiveness of a creditor as the difference between
the (truncated) liability towards him and the payment he receives. Formally, let (A, `) ∈
LN be a liability problem and x ∈ RN+ be an allocation. The debt forgiveness of creditor
i ∈ C is given by `i − xi. The truncated debt forgiveness by creditor i ∈ C is given by
`Ai − xi = min{A, `i} − xi.
Example 10. Consider a generic liability problem with two creditors, so N = {0, 1, 2}
and A ≤ `1 + `2. The induced liability game v is the following:
S {0} {1} {2} {0, 1} {0, 2} {1, 2} {0, 1, 2}
v(S) 0 A− `A2 A− `A1 `A1 `A2 A A
We can compute the Shapley allocation from sharing system (9) derived for 3-player
constant-sum games. This format is very useful for studying various properties of the
13
         
Shapley rule.
S 3 0 {0} {0, 1} {0, 2} N
v(S) 0 `A1 `
A
2 A
φ0 2/3 1/3 1/3 −1/3
φ1 −1/3 1/3 −2/3 2/3
φ2 −1/3 −2/3 1/3 2/3
(11)
The Shapley payments are obtained by multiplying row [v(S)] of the coalition values
by row [φk] of the shares for player k ∈ N . We can derive the following formulas and
bounds (from A ≤ `1 + `2 implying A ≤ `A1 + `A2 ≤ 2A).
For the firm,








Clearly both bounds are sharp. Notice that at the Shapley allocation, an insolvent firm
ends up with a strictly positive payoff.




`Ai − 2`Aj + 2A
3
= `Ai − 2φ0 ≤ `Ai .
It is easily seen that both bounds are sharp. For the debt forgiveness and for the
truncated debt forgiveness of creditor i ∈ C, we immediately get the following sharp
bounds:
`i − `Ai ≤ `i − φi ≤ `i −
`Ai
3




Observe that both creditors give the same truncated debt forgiveness (2φ0) to the firm.
It also follows from the above formulas that if `i ≤ `j, hence also `Ai ≤ `Aj , then
φi ≤ φj and `i − φi ≤ `j − φj. That is, at the Shapley allocation, the creditor with
higher claim gets higher payment, but it also gives an at least as high debt forgiveness.
4 Properties of the Shapley liability rule
In this section, we generalize the observations we made on the Shapley allocations for
2-creditor liability problems in Example 10 and investigate further properties of the
Shapley rule.
As observed in Proposition 9, the Shapley rule satisfies efficiency, non-negativity and
(truncated) liabilities boundedness, hence it is a liability rule. As noticed in Remark
14
         
8, the Shapley rule (as any rule induced by a solution of an associated TU game)
ignores excessive parts of claims, that is, φ(A, `) = φ(A, `A). It is also easily seen
that the Shapley rule respects minimal rights of creditors, that is, it satisfies φi ≥
max{0, A− `(C \ i)} for any i ∈ C. Indeed, the minimal right of creditor i is precisely
his value v(i) in the associated liability game, which is superadditive, and the Shapley
value is well-known to prescribe individually acceptable payoffs in superadditive games.
Since liability games are constant-sum, from sharing table (8), taken into account
that v(0 ∪ S) = `AS for coalitions of the form 0 ∪ S with S ⊆ C, we get that for liability
problem (A, `) the Shapley rule prescribes the following payments.











S∪i − `AS ), (i ∈ C) (13)
where s = |S| and `AS = min{A,
∑
i∈S `i}.
4.1 Bounds on the Shapley payments
First, we establish lower and upper bounds for the Shapley payment of the firm.
Proposition 11. Let (A, `) ∈ LN be a liability problem and let v be the induced liability
game on N . Then for the Shapley payment of the firm φ0 we have that








Proof. Since v(0) = `A∅ = 0, v(N) = `
A












If n = 2 then the summation in (15) is over the empty set, thus φ0(A, `) = 0. It
means that the Shapley rule allocates the full asset value to the single creditor. In
contrast, if c ≥ 2, then the firm has some implicit bargaining leverage by threatening
to form a coalition with the other creditors and compensate them first up to their
full liabilities or the asset value. From `AS + `
A
C\S = min{2A,A + `S, A + `C\S, `C} =
A + min{A, `S, `C\S, `C − A} and
∑
∅6=S 6=C γn(s) =
n−2
n
, where s = |S|, we get φ0 =∑
∅6=S 6=C
γn(s) min{A, `S, `C\S, `C − A}. Equation (14) now follows.
In the insolvent (non-degenerate) case, that is, if `C > A (and A > 0 and mini∈C `i >
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0), the lower bound is positive, that is, the firm ends up with positive payoff. The lower
bound in (14) is sharp if and only if `C − A ≤ A and `C − A ≤ mini∈C `i, that is, the
deficiency of the firm does not exceed any of the individual liabilities and the asset value.
The upper bound in (14) is sharp if and only if A ≤ mini∈C `i (that implies `C −A ≥ A
for c ≥ 2), that is, all creditors claim the full asset value so each one is willing to forgive
some of its debt to stay a partner of the firm and receive some positive payment. Note
that in this case as the number of creditors increases, the firm can keep almost all the
asset value.
Second, we establish lower and upper bounds for the Shapley payments of the cred-
itors.
Proposition 12. Let (A, `) ∈ LN be a liability problem and let v be the induced liability














Proof. Since v(0) = `A∅ = 0 and γn(1) =
1










S∪i − `AS ). (17)
If n = 2, that is, C = {1}, then the summation in (17) is over the empty set, thus
φ1(A, `) = `
A
i . It means that the Shapley rule allocates the full asset value to the single
creditor. In contrast, if c ≥ 2 then the summation in (17) is clearly non-negative, and
it is zero if and only if A ≤ `Ai for all i ∈ C. On the other side, `AS∪i − `AS = min{A −
`AS , `
A
i } ≤ `Ai in case of A > `AS . It follows from
∑
∅6=S⊆C\i






















2n(n− 1) that the




i , and equality holds if and only if A ≥ `C
(that implies A ≥ `S∪i for all S ⊆ C \ i).
Both bounds are sharp in (16). The lower bound is attained when all creditors claim
the full asset value, hence considerably weaken each other’s bargaining position. On the
other side, the creditors can be fully compensated if and only if the firm is solvent.
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4.2 Order preservation and monotonicity properties
First, we show that creditors with higher claims get higher Shapley payments, a prop-
erty called order preservation in the review article on bankruptcy rules by Thomson
(2015). We also show that creditors with higher claims also give higher (truncated)
debt forgiveness.
Proposition 13. Let (A, `) ∈ LN be a liability problem and v the induced liability
game. Let i, j ∈ C be such that `i ≤ `j. At the Shapley value it holds that φi ≤ φj,
`i − φi ≤ `j − φj and `Ai − φi ≤ `Aj − φj.
Proof. Let i, j ∈ C be two creditors with `i ≤ `j, hence also `Ai ≤ `Aj . Since liability
games are constant-sum games, we use formula (2) to show 0 ≤ φj−φi ≤ `Aj −`Ai ≤ `j−`i.
When taking the difference φj − φi the terms v(S ∪ i∪ j), S ⊆ N \ {i, j}, containing












(v(S ∪ j)− v(S ∪ i)). (18)
It is easily checked from the definition of v that 0 ≤ v(S∪j)−v(S∪i) ≤ `Aj −`Ai ≤ `j−`i
for all S ⊆ N \ {i, j}. Substituting each term in (18) with these non-negative constant
bounds gives








































) = 1, and the obvious `Aj −`Ai ≤ `j−`i,
the claim follows.
Note that order preservation in Proposition 13 obviously implies equal treatment of
equal creditors, that is, if two creditors have the same claims, then they should get the
same compensations. From Proposition 13 we readily get that the Shapley rule treats
creditors with equal (truncated) liabilities in the same way.
Corollary 14. Let (A, `) ∈ LN be a liability problem and v the induced liability game.
Let i, j ∈ C be such that `i = `j. At the Shapley value it holds that φi = φj, `i − φi =
`j − φj and `Ai − φi = `Aj − φj.
Next, we discuss three basic monotonicity properties of liability rules. The question
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is how changes in certain parameters of a liability problem influence the payments of
the agents.
Definition 15. Liability rule f : LN → RN+ is said to be
1. liability monotonic if for any creditor i ∈ C and liability problems (A, `), (A, `′)
such that `′i > `i and `
′
k = `k for all k ∈ C \ i, it holds that fi(A, `′) ≥ fi(A, `).
2. asset monotonic for creditors if for any creditor i ∈ C and liability problems (A, `),
(A′, `) such that `(C) ≥ A′ > A, it holds that fi(A′, `) ≥ fi(A, `).
3. super-modular for creditors if for any two creditors i, j ∈ C with `i ≥ `j and
liability problems (A, `), (A′, `) such that `(C) ≥ A′ > A, it holds that fi(A′, `)−
fi(A, `) ≥ fj(A′, `)− fj(A, `).
In the following three theorems we prove that the Shapley rule satisfies these three
monotonicity properties. We also make some observations on the changes in the firm’s
payment.
First, we show that the Shapley rule is liability monotonic. It means that the pay-
ment of a creditor can only increase if his liability increases, but every other parameter
of the problem stays put. Moreover, we show that also the firm can only benefit from
the increase of a liability.
Proposition 16. Let liability problems (A, `) and (A, `′) be such that `′i > `i for i ∈ C,
and `′k = `k for all k ∈ C \ i. Then
φi(A, `




i − `i, A− `Ai }.
Moreover, φ0(A, `
′) ≥ φ0(A, `).
Proof. Let liability problems (A, `) and (A, `′) be such that `′i > `i for i ∈ C, and `′k = `k
for all k ∈ C \ i. Clearly, `′AS∪i ≥ `AS∪i and `′AS = `AS whenever S ⊆ C \ i. From formula
(17) we get
φi(A, `









S∪i − `AS∪i). (20)
Since the summation term in (20) is non-negative, and `′Ai − `Ai = min{`′i − `i, A− `Ai },
the inequality for φi(A, `) follows.
From formula (12) we get
φ0(A, `










S − `AS ). (21)
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Since each term in the first summation is non-negative, and zero in the second one, we
conclude that the payment to the firm can only increase if a liability increases.
Second, we show that the Shapley rule is asset monotonic for creditors. It means
that the payments to the creditors can only increase if the asset value increases, but all
liabilities remain the same. Moreover, we observe that the firm can end up with smaller
or with higher payoff.
Proposition 17. Let liability problems (A, `) and (A′, `) be such that `(C) ≥ A′ > A.
Then for any creditor i ∈ C,
0 ≤ φi(A′, `)− φi(A, `) ≤ min{A′ − A, `i},
and for the firm,
2− n
n




Moreover, for c = |C| ≥ 2, all bounds are sharp.
In case of a single creditor, C = {1}, φ1(A′, `) − φ1(A, `) = A′ − A and φ0(A′, `) =
φ0(A, `).
Proof. Let liability problems (A, `) and (A′, `) be such that `(C) ≥ A′ > A. From
formula (13) we get for any i ∈ C,
φi(A







S∪i − `AS∪i)− (`A
′
S − `AS )
]
. (22)




S∪i − `AS∪i)− (`A
′








S )− (`AS∪i − `AS )
]
and the dif-
ference `AS∪i − `AS = min{`i, A − `AS} where A − `AS = max{A − `S, 0} is clearly non-
decreasing in A, we get that the difference in the bracket in each term is non-negative,
implying asset monotonicity for creditor i ∈ C.
Let us assume c ≥ 2. Then there are at least two different terms in (22). One is the





i − `Ai )− (0− 0)
]
. The difference in the bracket
can range from 0 (attained, if `i ≤ A < A′) to min{A′ − A, `i} (attained, if A < A′ ≤












(A′ − A)− (`A′C\i − `AC\i)
]
. Again, the difference in the bracket can range from 0
(attained, if A < A′ ≤ `C\i) to (A′ − A) (attained, if `C\i ≤ A < A′)). Likewise, if
`i ≤ A < A′ but A < A′ ≤ `j for any other creditor j 6= i, then all terms in (22) are
zero, implying that the zero lower bound is indeed sharp. In contrast, if A < A′ ≤ `i but
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`C\i ≤ A < A′ (implying `j ≤ A < A′ for any other creditor j 6= i), then the differences
in all brackets in (22) are equal to min{A′ − A, `i}. In light of 2
∑
S⊆C\i γn(s + 1) = 1,
the claimed upper bound is also sharp.
For the change in the Shapley payment to the firm, taken into account that `A∅ = 0
and `AC = A, from formula (12) we get
φ0(A





S − `AS ) +
2
n
(A′ − A). (23)
Since the difference `A
′
S − `AS is clearly non-negative but cannot exceed A′ − A, from∑
∅6=S(C γn(s) = 1 − 2n , the claimed inequalities for the difference φ0(A′, `) − φ0(A, `)
follow. The negative lower bound is attained if `S ≤ A for every non-empty set of
creditors S 6= C implying `A′S − `AS = 0. The positive upper bound is attained if `i ≥ A′
for all creditors i ∈ C implying `S ≥ A′ and `A′S − `AS = A′ − A for every non-empty set
of creditors S 6= C.







i − `Ai )− (0− 0)
]
= A′ − A, reconfirming that the Shapley rule
gives everything to the single creditor. By efficiency, the firm ends up with nothing,
thus, φ0(A
′, `)− φ0(A, `) = 0− 0 = 0. Notice that for n = 2, the summation in (23) is
over the empty set, and the claimed lower and upper bounds coincide at zero.
Finally, we show that the Shapley rule is super-modular for creditors. It means
that creditors with higher liabilities receive more from the increment in the asset value.
This property is a kind of combination of order preservation (when the payments to
two creditors in the same problem are compared) and asset monotonicity (when the
payments to the same creditor in two related problems are compared).
Proposition 18. Let liability problems (A, `) and (A′, `) be such that `(C) ≥ A′ > A.
If `i ≥ `j for creditors i, j ∈ C then
0 ≤ (φi(A′, `)− φi(A, `))− (φj(A′, `)− φj(A, `)) ≤ min{`i − `j;A′ − A}. (24)
Proof. Given two creditors i, j ∈ C, a set of creditors S ⊆ C can be one of four types:
S contains both i and j; contains i but not j; contains j but not i; contains neither i
nor j. For brevity, we represent S ⊆ C respectively as Rij, Ri, Rj, R with a generic



























         
Exchanging i and j gives φj(A


























Subtracting (26) from (25) gives (φi(A













Suppose `i ≥ `j, implying `Ri ≥ `Rj. It is easily checked that
(`A
′
Ri − `ARi)− (`A
′




0, if `Rj ≤ `Ri ≤ A ≤ A′,
`Ri − A, if `Rj ≤ A ≤ `Ri ≤ A′,
A′ − A, if `Rj ≤ A ≤ A′ ≤ `Ri,
`Ri − `Rj, if A ≤ `Rj ≤ `Ri ≤ A′,
A′ − `Rj, if A ≤ `Rj ≤ A′ ≤ `Ri,
0, if A ≤ A′ ≤ `Rj ≤ `Ri.
It follows that
0 ≤ (`A′Ri − `ARi)− (`A
′
Rj − `ARj) ≤ min{`Ri − `Rj = `i − `j;A′ − A}.
Taken into account that
∑
R⊆C\ij
[γn(r + 1) + γn(r + 2)] =
∑
R⊆C\ij







γn(s+ 1) = 1/2,
where q = |Q| and s = |S|, from (27) we get the claimed inequalities in (24).
A straightforward corollary of Proposition 18 is that if `i = `j for creditors i, j ∈ C
then φi(A
′, `) − φi(A, `) = φj(A′, `) − φj(A, `). Clearly, this also follows from the equal
treatment property of the Shapley rule (Corollary 14).
5 Complexity of computing the Shapley value
Even though liability games are constant-sum games and we showed in (12) and (13)
that the Shapley value of a liability game can be directly calculated from the parameters
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of the underlying liability problem, now we prove that calculating the Shapley payoff to
the firm is NP-hard3.
Theorem 19. Given two liability problems and the induced liability games, it is NP-hard
to verify whether the firm has the same Shapley value in both games.
Proof. Recall the NP-complete subset sum problem SUBSUM (See for instance (Garey
and Johnson, 1979)): given a1, a2, . . . , an ∈ Z and K ∈ Z we ask whether there exists
a subset ai1 , ai2 , . . . , aik such that
∑
aij = K. Here we consider a special case of this
problem, HALFSUM: given positive integers a1, a2, . . . , an we ask whether there exists






. It is very easy to show by the following
steps that HALFSUM is still NP-complete.
• It is trivial to show that SUBSUM is NP-complete if we restrict it to even numbers,
so we can assume that
∑
ai is even.
• We get an equivalent instance of SUBSUM if we replace K by ∑ ai −K. Using










−K to the set.
We reduce HALFSUM to the Shapley value calculation. Let HS = (a1, a2, . . . , an)
be an instance of the HALFSUM problem. Consider the liability problems (A, `) and




. Let v and v2 be
the liability games corresponding to (A, `) and (A − 1, `), respectively. We show that
the defaulting firm has a different Shapley value in v and v2 if and only if the instance
of the HALFSUM problem has a solution.
Given a subset of creditors S ⊆ C, let mc(S) = v(S∪{0})−v(S) be the marginal con-






`(S), if `(S) ≤ A,
`(C \ S), if `(S) ≥ A.
(28)
To prove (28), recall that the value of the assets A is exactly half of the sum of
liabilities. Notice that creditors in S can be paid if and only if creditors in C \S cannot
3(Aziz, 2013) shows that for regular bankruptcy problems, the computation of the Shapley value is
#P-complete.
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be paid. If `(S) ≤ A, then v(S) = 0, however, in this case v(S ∪ {0}) = `(S). If
`(S) ≥ A, then v(S) = A− `(C \ S) and v(S ∪ {0}) = A.




|S|!(n− |S| − 1)!mc(S) =
∑
`(S)<A




|S|!(n− |S| − 1)!A +
∑
`(S)>A
|S|!(n− |S| − 1)!`(C \ S). (29)
Now consider the game v2, that is, decrease the asset value A by 1. Let mc2(S) =
v2(S ∪ {0})− v2(S).
If S is a coalition such that `(S) < A, then `(S) ≤ A− 1, so the liabilities in S can
still be paid in v2 and `(C \ S) > A > A − 1, liabilities in C \ S obviously cannot be
paid with less asset value. It follows that v2(S) = 0 and v2(S ∪ {0}) = `(S). (Recall
that ` is the same in both problems.) Now let’s consider a coalition of creditors S ⊂ C
such that `(S) > A. In this case `(C \ S) < A, that is, `(C \ S) ≤ A − 1. Liabilities
in S cannot be paid and liabilities in C \ S can be paid not only in game v but also
in game v2. This means that v2(S) = A − 1 − `(C \ S) and v2(S ∪ {0}) = A − 1, so
mc(S) = (A− 1)− (A− 1− `(C \ S) = `(C \ S).
It follows that in (29), the first and the last term do not change in v2, implying that
if HS is a FALSE instance of problem HALFSUM, then the sum of these terms does
not change when we decrease the value of assets by 1. In this case, the second term is
empty.
On the other hand, let’s consider a coalition where `(S) = A exactly. In this case,
v(S) = 0 and v(S ∪ {0}) = mc(S) = A in the first game. However, in the second game,
v2(S) = v(S) = 0 but v2(S ∪ {0}) = mc2(S) = A− 1. If HS is a TRUE instance of the
HALFSUM problem, then the Shapley value of player 0 decreased in game v2 compared
to game v.
6 Concluding remarks
Liability games are constant-sum transferable utility games, generalizing bankruptcy
games by treating the estate (firm) as a player. We investigate the Shapley value of
liability games. We propose a basis for the linear vector space of constant-sum games
that provides a specialized formula for the Shapley payoff to a player in a constant-sum
game. We show that the Shapley value can also be used as a liability allocation rule,
that is, it allocates the asset value non-negatively among the creditors and the firm
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in such a way that no creditor gets more than his liability. We establish lower and
upper bounds for the Shapley payments to the creditors as well as to the firm. On
top of proving order preservation, we establish three main monotonicity properties of
the Shapley rule: liability monotonicity, asset monotonicity for creditors, and super-
modularity for creditors. Finally, we show that in liability problems calculating the
Shapley payment to the insolvent firm is NP-hard.
Structurally, liability games and bankruptcy games are intimately connected: the
subgame of a liability game restricted to the set of creditors is a bankruptcy game (as
defined by O’Neill (1982)) and the other “half-game” (on the coalitions containing the
firm) is the dual game of that bankruptcy subgame. One may wonder if there is any
relation between the Shapley value in a liability game and the Shapley value in its
bankruptcy subgame or in another “naturally associated” bankruptcy game. Based on
Example 20, we do not believe that any “simple structural” relation could be found.
Example 20. We take two-creditor liability games (the simplest non-trivial type) and
associate with each one two two-creditor bankruptcy games:
• Type A: we only reduce the asset value with the Shapley payment to the firm, but
keep the original claims of the creditors;
• Type B: we reduce the asset value with the Shapley payment to the firm, and
we also reduce the claims by half of the firm’s payment (assuming that the cred-
itors accept this amount as a fixed loss, split it equally, and reduce their claims
accordingly).
Consider the following three instances, differing only in the asset value.
1. The Shapley payments to the creditors in the liability situation are different from
the Shapley payments in both bankruptcy situations:
liability A = 36, `1 = 34, `2 = 32 ϕ0 = 10, ϕ1 = 14, ϕ2 = 12
bankruptcy A E = 26, c1 = 34, c2 = 32 ϕ
A
1 = 13, ϕ
A
2 = 13
bankruptcy B E = 26, c1 = 29, c2 = 27 ϕ
B
1 = 13, ϕ
B
2 = 13
2. The creditor’s Shapley payments in the liability situation are different from the
Shapley payments in the type A bankruptcy situation, but coincide with those in
the type B bankruptcy situation:
liability A = 39, `1 = 34, `2 = 32 ϕ0 = 9, ϕ1 = 16, ϕ2 = 14
bankruptcy A E = 30, c1 = 34, c2 = 32 ϕ
A
1 = 15, ϕ
A
2 = 15
bankruptcy B E = 30, c1 = 59/2, c2 = 55/2 ϕ
B




         
3. The Shapley payments to the creditors in the liability situation are the same as
the Shapley payments in both associated bankruptcy situations:
liability A = 42, `1 = 34, `2 = 32 ϕ0 = 8, ϕ1 = 18, ϕ2 = 16
bankruptcy A E = 34, c1 = 34, c2 = 32 ϕ
A
1 = 18, ϕ
A
2 = 16
bankruptcy B E = 34, c1 = 30, c2 = 28 ϕ
B
1 = 18, ϕ
B
2 = 16
However, there are many possibilities for further research. One could investigate the
analogues of the various other monotonicity properties discussed in the rich literature
on bankruptcy problems, see the book (Thomson, 2019) for a detailed treatment. This,
together with our basis, could help to get a new characterization of the Shapley value
on the class of liability or constant-sum games. There are also other important values
to be considered in a liability game, for instance the Banzhaf value (Banzhaf, 1965) or
the solidarity value (Nowak and Radzik, 1994). Liability games could be generalized
to a setting with nontransferable utility, when players have individual utility functions
over their monetary payoffs. Analyzing generalizations of solutions concepts in such a
setting is also very promising.
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Balog, D., T. L. Bátyi, P. Csóka, and M. Pintér (2017): “Properties and com-
parison of risk capital allocation methods,” European Journal of Operational Research,
259(2), 614–625.
Banzhaf, J. F. (1965): “Weighted voting doesn’t work: A mathematical analysis,”
Rutgers Law Review, 19, 317.
Bergantinos, G., and S. Lorenzo-Freire (2008): “Optimistic weighted Shapley
rules in minimum cost spanning tree problems,” European Journal of Operational
Research, 185(1), 289–298.
Bilbao, J. M., and M. Ordóñez (2009): “Axiomatizations of the Shapley value for
games on augmenting systems,” European Journal of Operational Research, 196(3),
1008–1014.
Cai, Y., O. Candogan, C. Daskalakis, and C. Papadimitriou (2016): “Zero-
sum polymatrix games: A generalization of minmax,” Mathematics of Operations
Research, 41(2), 648–655.
25
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bankruptcy problems: consistency and the relative adjustment principle,” Review
of Economic Design, 24(1), 101–122.
Dietzenbacher, B., and H. Peters (2020): “Characterizing NTU-bankruptcy rules
using bargaining axioms,” Annals of Operations Research, pp. 1–18.
Dubey, P. (1982): “The shapley value as aircraft landing fees–revisited,” Management
Science, 28(8), 869–874.
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